# Threats and Countermeasures


#### Lecture 09: Defense Evasion

COMP-5830/-6830 Spring 2025



# Today: tc-vm-o6\_rco8





Disk Crypto: AUfw4FfWsJv4SYz52rYdvjoQ


## **MIDTERM**



- Grading in-progress, target is Friday
  - Scan and upload as Canvas comment
- Common Point Deductions (current):
  - Poor coverage of target network
  - Faulty interpretation of data and risk
  - Incorrect assertions of facts to the customer

#### MITRE ATT&CK





## **Defense Evasion (MITRE)**



Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts. Adversaries also leverage and abuse trusted processes to hide and masquerade their malware. Other tactics' techniques are cross-listed here when those techniques include the added benefit of subverting defenses.

#### Defense Evasion 42 techniques

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4)

Access Token Manipulation (5)

**BITS Jobs** 

**Build Image on Host** 

**Debugger Evasion** 

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

**Deploy Container** 

**Direct Volume Access** 

Domain Policy Modification (2)

Execution Guardrails (1)

**Exploitation for Defense Evasion** 

File and Directory Permissions Modification (2)

Hide Artifacts (10)

Hijack Execution Flow (12)

Impair Defenses (9)

Indicator Removal (9)

Indirect Command Execution

Masquerading (7)

Modify Authentication Process (7)

Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure (4)

**Modify Registry** 

## **Defense Evasion (simplified)**



- GOAL: Avoid detection during compromise
- EX:
  - Reconfigure ENV
  - Deactivate host-based defenses
  - Suppress own artifacts (data/code/etc)

Defense Evasion 42 techniques
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Modify Authentication Process (7)
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure (4)
Modify Registry



Anti-Virus





- Anti-Virus
  - Heuristic- and Signature-based detection of unwanted apps/code/malware
  - Automated OS interference to remove and/or quarantine






- Anti-Virus
- Network IPS





- Anti-Virus
- Network IPS
  - Monitor network traffic for specific heuristics
  - Automated network interference to block interaction








- Anti-Virus
- Network IPS
- Filesystem Watchdog





- Anti-Virus
- Network IPS
- Filesystem Watchdog
  - Monitors specific filesystem locations for state-changes
  - Automated alerts on contents/metadata changes








- Anti-Virus
- Network IPS
- Filesystem Watchdog
- Aggregate logs/alerts





- Anti-Virus
- Network IPS
- Filesystem Watchdog
- Aggregate logs/alerts
  - Stream logs/alerts/etc.
     to remove location for independent storage
  - Allows trend-detection



# So...How Do We Fix Our Problems?





# **Bypass: Deactivate Defenses**





#### MITRE ATT&CK




#### **Privilege Escalation**

13 techniques

**Defense Evasion** 

42 techniques



#### MITRE ATT&CK



#### **Privilege Escalation**


13 techniques

**AFTER** 

ring platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux, PRE, Azure AD, Office 365, Google


#### **Defense Evasion**

42 techniques



## Bypass: Deactivate Defenses







- Most defenses are best effort via either signature or heuristic checks
  - Signature: specific indicator
  - Heuristic: collection of non-indicators constituting a likely indicator

# **Bypass: Encrypt/Obfuscate**



- Most defenses are best effort via either signature or heuristic checks
  - Signature: specific indicator
  - Heuristic: collection of non-indicators constituting a likely indicator

```
openssl aes-256-cbc
-d -salt
-k f361cf6aa41474db459c55b99c58c609
-in xxxx.ovpn.enc -out xxxx.ovpn
```



- Signature-based malware detectors often rely solely on constants in the malware
  - String, sequence of instructions, etc.




- Signature-based malware detectors often rely solely on constants in the malware
  - String, sequence of instructions, etc.
- Approaches:
  - Remove unneeded constants ("strip" binaries)

```
-duw <(size -Ax hello) <(size -Ax hello.debug)
   /proc/self/fd/17
                          2022-03-04 16:14:48.135230786 -0500
++ /proc/self/fd/18
                          2022-03-04 16:14:48.135230786 -0500
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
hello.debug :
section
                         size
                                   addr
.interp
                         0x1c
                                   0x318
.note.gnu.property
                         0x30
                                  0x338
@ -27,6 +27,15 @@
.data
                         0x10
                                 0x4000
bss
                          0x8
                                 0x4010
                         0x25
                                     0x0
comment
 debug aranges
                                      0 \times 0
 debug info
                          0x35
                          0x15
                                      0 \times 0
debug line
                          0xe8
                                      0 \times 0
 debua str
                          0x2f
                                      0 \times 0
 debug addr
                          0 \times 10
debug line str
                                      0 \times 0
debug gnu pubnames
                          0x1c
debug gnu pubtypes.
                                      0 \times 0
                         0xc42
```




- Signature-based malware detectors often rely solely on constants in the malware
  - String, sequence of instructions, etc.
- Approaches:
  - Use difficult-to-analyze control-flows (compilers can optimize far beyond humans)





- Signature-based malware detectors often rely solely on constants in the malware
  - String, sequence of instructions, etc.
- Approaches:
  - Use difficult-to-analyze binary layouts ("packed" binaries or custom compilation)





 All defenses rely on ability to see the artifacts of maliciousness

# Bypass: Hide



 All defenses rely on ability to see the artifacts of maliciousness




# Don't Disrupt Usage



People start looking when things seem "off"






# Don't Disrupt Usage



People start looking when things seem "off"






# Don't Disrupt Usage



People start looking when things seem "off"





OS mediates access to HW




- OS mediates access to HW
  - ...except when it doesn't...



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






- OS mediates access to HW
  - ...except when it doesn't...





Direct HW access allows ...non-traditional... HW usage



#### **How**

- Open handle to disk
- Parse filesystem metadata
- Reconstruct own storage map (inodes, data blocks, etc)



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- Open handle to disk
- Parse filesystem metadata
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#### What Can Be Used For

- Bypass OS access control and protections
- Access to "special" files (NTDS.dit, registry, etc)
- Recover deleted data
- Out-of-Band modification to files
- Storing artifacts

#### **Direct Volume Access**






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























karim@Ubu	untu2204:	:~\$ ps	s aux						
USER	PID	%CPU	%MEM	VSZ	RSS	TTY	STAT	START	TIME COMMAND
root	1	0.0	0.5	166784	11844	?	Ss	21:56	0:01 /sbin/init splash
root	2	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	S	21:56	0:00 [kthreadd]
root	3	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I<	21:56	0:00 [rcu_gp]
root	4	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I<	21:56	
root	5	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I<	21:56	0:00 [slub_flushwq]
root	6	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I<	21:56	0:00 [netns]
root	10	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I	21:56	0:00 [kworker/u4:0-events_power_efficie
root	11	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	<b>I</b> <	21:56	
root	12	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I	21:56	0:00 [rcu_tasks_kthread]
root	13	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I	21:56	0:00 [rcu_tasks_rude_kthread]
root	14	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I	21:56	0:00 [rcu_tasks_trace_kthread]
root	15	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	S	21:56	0:00 [ksoftirqd/0]
root	16	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I	21:56	0:00 [rcu_preempt]
root	17	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	S	21:56	0:00 [migration/0]
root	18	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	S	21:56	0:00 [idle_inject/0]
root	19	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	S	21:56	0:00 [cpuhp/0]
root	20	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	S	21:56	0:00 [cpuhp/1]
root	21	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	S	21:56	0:00 [idle_inject/1]
root	22	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	S	21:56	0:00 [migration/1]
root	23	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	S	21:56	0:00 [ksoftirad/1]







Anonymous 10/15/10(Fri)00:41:19 No.279648XXX [Reply]

As a former worker at Microsoft Inc. I and lots of others know that a file in every windows OS called "system32". What system32 is, is something that saves snapshots, history, and bookmarks of internet explorer and Netscape. This makes Microsoft know how to improve it's web experience. To get rid of system32 for why every reason, just open "my computer" or "computer" from the start menu and search in the top right corner "system32" and wait for EVERYTHING to load. Then, select all the files and folders named "system32" and simply delete them from windows. WARNING, DOING THIS COMPLETELY CLEARS YOUR BROWSING HISTORY.


39 posts and 3 image replies omitted. Click Reply to view.


Anonymous 10/15/10(Fri)01.01.41 No.279653XXX

ok can somebody please help me like just for 5 mins to get this laptop running again please my gf gunna be so pissed at me



- OSes have features to hide various artifacts for legitimate reasons
  - Protect important system files and administrative task execution
  - Avoid disrupting user work environments
  - Prevent users from changing files/features







- OSes have features to hide various artifacts for legitimate reasons
  - Protect important system files and administrative task execution
  - Avoid disrupting user work environments
  - Prevent users from changing files/features
- Sub-techniques include:
  - Hidden Files and Directories
  - Hidden Users
  - NTFS File Attributes Alternate Data Streams
  - Hidden File System
  - Virtual Instances
  - VBA Stomping

#### Threats and Countermeasures


#### Lecture 09: Defense Evasion

COMP-5830/-6830 Spring 2025



### Today: tc-vm-o6\_rco8





Disk Crypto: AUfw4FfWsJv4SYz52rYdvjoQ

## Per-Startup Kali Config



# When connecting to the local VM, have to setup Kali networking *every time you boot*.

- ifconfig eth0 down
  - Stop auto-detect
- ifconfig eth0 192.168.66.XXX
  netmask 255.255.255.0
  - Set Kali VM's IP address
- ip route add 192.168.66.0/24
  dev eth0
  - Tell Kali how to route to imported VM (1x only)

#### VM Usage



- Previous approaches are valid but must modify mechanism to bypass defenses
- Is setup to intentionally tell you (the attacker) when you've triggered defenses
  - Fail2Ban, TripWire, a very simple AV
  - Prints messages to the target-VM's screen when maliciousness is detected
- Demonstrates a basic, working implementation of Fail2Ban and TripWire

## Things to do



- Brute-force user password w/ Fail2Ban
  - Username: amy@ Two digits (0-9)
  - Password: PasswordXX
- Run linPEAS without triggering AV alert
- Determine TripWire coverage(what files/dirs)
- Recover from a TripWire alert without deactivating/re-configuring
  - Demonstrates relative difficulty of recovering once triggered vs. not triggering
- Reconfigure TripWire to ignore /etc/

#### Threats and Countermeasures

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